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APPROACHES TO CATEGORIZATION 
 The topic of categorization has prompted much work among psychologists, philosophers, 
linguists, and anthropologists over the years.  Historically, categories were thought to be distinct 
units in which membership was “all-or-none.”  Possession of a certain set of features would 
ensure each item a complete and equivalent degree of membership (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
This classical theory of concepts implies that most concepts are made up of complex 
representations that can be broken down into smaller representations. These representations can 
be thought of as definitions or requirements. Novel exemplars are put into certain categories 
when they meet a certain concept’s specified criteria (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). 
Although this theory may seem somewhat obvious on the surface, when considering 
categorization further, it seems that things are not so straightforward. There have been several 
criticisms of this theory.  To begin with, the term concept has not been clearly defined.  There is 
yet to be a definition that has consensus from all who study this area.  There also appears to be 
some debate about the difference between classes, categories and concepts (e.g., Zentall, Galizio 
& Critchfield, 2002).  
A behavioral approach to concepts was developed by Keller and Schoenfeld (1950) who 
took the approach that a class is formed when a group of stimuli control the same response.  The 
terms class, category, and concept can be used synonymously under this definition, and for the 
purpose of this paper, these terms will be used interchangeably.  However, according to some, 
there are different definitions for these terms.  In cognitive psychology, a category is thought to 
be a group of stimuli that  
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“belong together” and have been grouped accordingly, while a concept is considered to be the 
knowledge or mental representation that facilitates this categorization process (Zentall, Galizio, 
& Critchfield, 2002).   
In addition to the difficulties in defining the subject of categories and concepts, many 
concepts themselves do not have a clear definition.  This is known as “Plato’s Problem,” and can 
be seen when considering many basic categories like chairs, games, or birds.  For example, what 
defines a chair?  A chair could be defined as something that has four legs and a back.  This 
seems like good definition, but is not always appropriate.  A bean bag chair does not have four 
legs.    Like chairs, many basic concepts are too ambiguous or complex to be clearly defined.   
Another problem arises when we are mistaken about a concept; it is possible to know the 
definitions, but still be inaccurate about the concept.  For example, consider the properties of a 
disease like smallpox.  People used to believe diseases like these were caused by evil spirits.  
Today we know that these people were mistaken about the causes of smallpox. Their concept of 
smallpox had fundamental beliefs that were inaccurate.  The concept has changed over time and 
the classical theory cannot account for this change. Finally, the classical theory cannot account 
for items that do not clearly belong to one particular concept or why some items are better 
representations of a concept than others (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). 
Most modern approaches to categorization agree that “all-or-none” membership is not 
likely in most categories.  Most categories do not appear to have clear, definite properties.  For 
example, some theorists may define the category of furniture structurally as common items found 
in a house.  In addition, furniture can also be defined  
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functionally as something we sit on, lie on, (couch, bed) or something we sit objects on (table, 
desk).  It is easy to see that some examples of furniture fit the above definitions ‘better’ than 
others.  Most would agree that a bed or a table is furniture, but what about a lamp?  Is a lamp 
considered furniture?  It does not meet the functional definition but does meet the structural 
definition.  Thus, a couch seems to be, in some respects, a “better” example of furniture than a 
lamp.  In most categories, some members possess more of the typical and relevant features and 
are therefore considered to be more representative of the category.   
These are the sorts of observations that led to the family-resemblance theory of 
categorization.  Rosch (1975) emphasizes the mental representation of the structure of features of 
categories.  Some categories, like families, have features that are common, but do not occur in 
every example.  Some members of a category are more representative than others because they 
possess more of the common features.  There is no set definition of which features category 
members should have, but there is an overall understanding of the common features (Rosch, 
1975).   
Rosch and Mervis (1975) tested the family-resemblance theory in semantic or natural 
language categories and in artificial or laboratory-created categories.  They hypothesized that the 
degree to which a particular item possessed a family resemblance to other members of the same 
category would be positively correlated with ratings of what is most typical of a category.  These 
ratings are known as prototypicality ratings.  In addition, they hypothesized that members with 
more of the common features would be responded to differently (e.g., faster responding and 
learning).  
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To look at semantic categories, 400 participants were asked to list attributes for nouns in 
six distinct categories (furniture, vehicle, fruit, weapon, vegetable, and clothing).  20 nouns were 
used for each of the six categories.    Each subject was asked to make an attribute list for six 
items, one from each category.  Each category had predetermined features or attributes of 
typicality.  For each of the nouns, the number of attributes was totaled, and a typicality rating 
obtained.  In support of their hypothesis, findings showed that subject’s ratings of 
representativeness of a category member depended on how many attributes it shared with other 
members.  For example, in the category of vehicle, car and truck were seen as better examples 
than skates or an elevator.  In the category of fruit, orange and apple were seen as better 
examples than a tomato or an olive. 
When using artificial categories, Rosch and Mervis found similar results.    Arbitrary 
letter and number sequences were used to increase experimental control.   The letter strings with 
different degrees of feature overlap were compared with control conditions with no feature 
overlap.  There were six letter strings in each category, with five or six letters in each string.  
Each letter string had a family resemblance score that was derived from how many letters the 
string shared with the other letter strings.  For each category of six letter strings, the strings were 
paired, by twos, in three groups. The groups, high, medium, and low were determined by the 
rating.  Two experimental stimulus designs possessed varying degrees of family resemblance.  
The symmetric categories contained two central strings of letters that shared the most letters in 
common with other letter strings in the category.  The asymmetrical categories had one letter that 
was contained in five strings, another letter that was contained in four strings, another in  
three strings, another in two, and another in one.  The degree of typicality was measured by the 
number of strings the letter was in.  Subjects learned to identify two categories of letter strings in 
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one of the three conditions.  After the letter strings were learned, the subjects were given six 
cards for each category and asked to rank according to typicality.  Acquisition and responding 
was more rapid and typicality ratings were higher for the stimuli that were more representative of 
the category.  These studies led Rosch to a theory of categorization in which stimuli are 
categorized by comparisons with a prototype.  
Another theory proposed to explain categorization is the psychological essentialist 
theory.  Psychological essentialism suggests that people behave as if they have pre-wired 
concepts, and are biased to form categories based on what is essential.  A mental picture of the 
“essence” of a category exists in the mind (Medin & Ortony, 1989).  Humans are biased to form 
categories on the basis of particular properties.  A study that illustrates this theoretical 
perspective showed that when a child is shown a picture of a raccoon and then asked to imagine 
that it has a painted white stripe on it, implying that it is now a skunk; the child still insists that it 
is a raccoon.  The child recognizes that the paint is not an essential feature and that it is not 
included in the essence of a skunk (Keil, 1989).   
The exemplar theory of concepts rejects the idea that a single representation in the mind 
defines a concept.   Instead, exemplar theory suggests that a person’s concept of something 
includes different examples of that thing that they remember.  Since there is no “summary 
representation” that stands for a concept, there must be many examples included.  For example, a 
person’s concept of dogs would include a set of dogs that the  
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person remembers (Murphy, 2002).  
Cognitive theories, including the ones mentioned above, have been the dominant 
approach to categorization research.  While much can be learned from these cognitive theories, 
which focus on the structural mental representations of categories, it is important to understand 
that other theories exist.  For example, behavior analytic approaches to categorization emphasize 
the functional aspects of categories, but it seems they are not well represented in the literature 
(Laurence & Margolis, 1999).  The present study is an exploration of the value of such a 
functional approach derived from the work of Murray Sidman.  Sidman (1994) has greatly 
contributed to this area with his work in stimulus equivalence.  Before discussing some of his 
findings, a review of stimulus equivalence is needed. 
UNDERSTANDING STIMULUS EQUIVALENCE 
Behavior-analytic approaches attempt to understand complex behavior by breaking it 
down into simpler units.  For example, Sidman’s (2000) theory explains symbolic behavior in 
terms of reinforcement contingencies.  To begin with, a two-term contingency, including a 
response and reinforcer, would be the most basic unit.  A three-term contingency occurs when a 
discriminative stimulus is added to the response and reinforcer.  Now this two-term contingency 
comes under the control of a discriminative stimulus.  That is, a discriminative stimulus sets the 
occasion for a  response to occur, which then results in a reinforcer.  For example, a child learns 
that when an adult is around (discriminative stimulus) throwing a tantrum (response) will lead to 
candy (positive reinforcer), so through differential reinforcement, the child throws tantrums  
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when adults are around to get his way.  The three-term contingency can be thought of as a simple 
unit of operant behavior. 
A four-term contingency can be formed by adding another term.  This new term is a 
condition that determines whether or not a three-term contingency is to be activated.  In this 
situation, the response may produce reinforcement in the presence of either of two discriminative 
stimuli. The stimulus choice that is reinforced will depend on the conditional stimulus that is 
present. For example, a child learns that in the presence of his mother, screaming and crying will 
produce candy, but in the presence of his father, kicking the floor will produce candy.  The child 
has learned that in order to be reinforced, the type of tantrum he throws should depend on which 
adult he is around.  This type of four-term contingency is also known as a conditional 
discrimination.  
A procedure known as match-to-sample (MTS) employs these four-term contingencies.  
In MTS training, the subject is given a sample stimulus, and then comparison stimuli, the subject 
responds by matching the sample to one of the comparisons, and then receives a consequence.  
There are several types of matching that can occur.  Identity matching involves matching the 
sample to a physically identical comparison.  Oddity matching occurs when the sample is 
matched to a comparison that is different. As well as many other researchers, Sidman uses what 
is known as arbitrary or symbolic matching.  This type of matching occurs when the sample is 
matched to a comparison that does not share a physical relation.  This arbitrary MTS procedure 
is often used in establishing equivalence classes.  It is this procedure that has opened up new 
directions of study in behavior analysis.  
 
Defining Stimulus Equivalence 
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The defining properties of stimulus equivalence are best explained through mathematical 
terms.  Reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity must emerge after conditional discriminations 
have been trained.  Reflexivity is matching a stimulus to itself.  This can be thought of as a form 
of identity matching.  Symmetric relations demonstrate the ability to reverse the learned 
conditional discrimination.  Transitivity involves matching stimuli that were paired with a 
common stimulus, but were never paired together in training.   For example, if two conditional 
discriminations were trained (match A to B and match B to C) through differential 
reinforcement, then reflexivity ( A to A and B to B),  symmetry (B to A and C to A), and 
transitivity (B to C and C to B) should emerge without being directly trained and without being 
reinforced.  When a subject demonstrates all of these relations, the stimuli are said to be 
equivalent and can be used interchangeably.   This interchangeability defines an equivalence 
class. 
These basic properties of stimulus equivalence can be seen in Sidman and Tailby’s 
(1982) seminal study of stimulus equivalence.  They demonstrated equivalence-class formation 
from conditional discrimination training.  The eight children in their study were trained with 
three conditional discriminations through symbolic MTS.  The children were trained, using the 
Greek letters lambda, xi, and gamma, to match dictated letters to three different sets of printed 
letters.  An alpha-numeric notation is often used in equivalence research to help understand and 
simplify the description of training and class organization.  Typically the letters represent 
different stimuli that appear together as comparisons or as samples that appear separately.  The 
numbers represent the particular class.  Each of the three classes consisted of the dictated letter 
(A), the uppercase letter 
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 (B), the lowercase letter (C) and another set of printed Greek letters (D).  To train the A to B 
relation, an auditory sample (A1, A2, or A3) was played and the subjects had a choice between 
each of the uppercase letters (B1, B2, B3).   To train the A to C relations, auditory samples were 
matched to lowercase letters (C1, C2, C3).  The printed letters in set D were trained to the 
printed letters in set C.  The subject’s responses were only reinforced when correct.  For 
example, choosing B1 or C1 was reinforced for A1, choosing B2 or C2 was reinforced for A2, 
and choosing B3 or C3 was reinforced for A3.  In addition, choosing C1 was reinforced for D1.  
After acquisition of the three conditional discriminations, reinforcement was gradually reduced 
to help prepare the subjects for the upcoming probe trials in which responses were not 
reinforced. 
Probe trials were used to test for the formation of equivalence classes, and consisted of 
trials that tested for reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity.  The probe trials were mixed in with 
baseline trials to maintain a certain degree of familiarity and reinforcement.  Baseline scores 
were maintained throughout testing by all of the subjects.  Reflexivity trials presented A, B, or C 
stimuli as the sample and the identical counterpart were included in the comparisons.  In 
symmetry trials, C stimuli were samples and D stimuli were the comparisons.  Transitivity trials 
presented either one of the B stimuli as the sample and C stimuli as the comparisons, or one of 
the C stimuli as the sample and B stimuli as the comparisons.  Probe tests showed that most 
subjects had formed equivalence classes based on the conditional discrimination training. 
Why Does Equivalence Occur? 
There are several ways to approach equivalence research.  There is some debate about 
whether equivalence classes require special processes or are derived from more  
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basic ones.  Sidman (2000) argues that when a direct reinforcement contingency is put in place, 
equivalence classes that include all the elements involved in the contingency will automatically 
follow.  That is, equivalence is viewed as a fundamental process. According to Sidman, two-term 
contingencies, three-term contingencies and four-term contingencies should all generate 
equivalence classes.  Also, the reinforcer and the response should both become members of the 
equivalence class.  Two other leading theories take the stance that equivalence is not 
fundamental or automatic, but rather, requires learning. 
Relational Frame Theory considers equivalence relations to be learned.  Relational frame 
theorists believe that equivalence relations are not an automatic reaction to reinforcement 
contingencies, but that people have the capacity to learn many relations, and equivalence is one 
of these relations.  In a related theory, Horne and Lowe (1996) take the position that equivalence 
classes are learned through naming.  This naming can be overt or covert.  They claim that by the 
use of naming, a child’s behavior that has been established with a single stimulus comes to 
generalize to other objects that are physically unrelated.  Eventually, the child responds to these 
different objects similarly.  This emergent behavior, though not directly reinforced or trained, is 
a consequence of different stimuli being part of the same name relation.  Furthermore, Horne and 
Lowe believe that the successes humans have with match-to-sample procedures are directly 
contingent on naming the stimuli. 
A study by Lowe and Beasty (1987) shows how naming can facilitate subjects’ ability to 
pass equivalence tests.  The verbalizations of the children were recorded while performing 
visual-visual MTS task.  Children were first taught to match a vertical line to  
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green (A1 B1) and a horizontal line to red (A2 B2).  In the second phase children learned to 
match a vertical line to a triangle (A1 C1) and a horizontal line to a cross (A2 C2).  Of the 29 
subjects, 17 passed the tests for equivalence.  Recordings of the subjects’ verbalizations showed 
that all stimuli were named.  All of the children who passed equivalence tests had named the 
correct pairs during training.  For example, for the relation of A1B1, some of the children 
responded with “ up green”  and “up triangle” for the A1C1 relation.  Additionally, during 
training some of the children named all three members of the class even though only two of the 
members were presented at a time.  For example, when presented an A1B1 trial the subject might 
say “up green, up triangle.”  Eventually, when the subject is exposed to any of the members of 
this class, they will respond with “up green triangle.”  Through this naming, subjects associate 
up, green, and triangle, and have formed an equivalence class. 
Review of Equivalence Research 
Practical Applications 
An example that illustrates the practical applications of stimulus equivalence is Sidman 
and Cresson’s (1973) study.  They used conditional discriminations to teach reading 
comprehension to two severely retarded Down’s syndrome boys.  Using twenty common words 
(e.g., bee, box, car, hat), the subjects were trained with the dictated words (A), the pictures (B), 
and the printed words (C).  The subjects were first trained with identity matching and were 
taught to match printed words to each other (C to C).  Additionally they were trained to match 
dictated words to pictures (A to B).   They were next taught to name the pictures of the samples 
aloud (B to A) and then to select the printed word that matched the dictated word (A to C).  After 
teaching auditory receptive reading by matching the picture to the printed word (B to C)  the 
subjects demonstrated simple reading comprehension by matching the printed word to the picture 
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(C to B) and the printed word to the dictated word (C to A).  Although time consuming, the 
results of this study provided evidence that persons with severe retardation can be taught some 
basic reading comprehension if the right method is employed. 
Training Structure 
Another area that has attracted interest is the training structure.  Training structure refers 
to the sequence in which conditional discriminations are presented and the arrangement of 
common stimuli (Saunders & Green, 1999).  There are several ways in which the structure of 
MTS training can differ.  One common training structure is known as one-to-many or sample-as-
node (SaN) training.  In this structure, the sample stimulus serves as the link, or node, between 
all other stimuli.  Training A to B and then A to C would be considered one-to-many training 
because the A (the sample in both conditional discriminations) relates to both B and C.  The 
reverse of this training structure is the many-to-one or comparison-as-node (CaN) training 
structure.  An example of this would be training B to A and then C to A.  In this case, A is still 
the node; however, this time it is the comparison and not the sample.  Last is a procedure known 
as a linear structure.  In this structure, each stimulus, with the exception of the first and last, is a 
node. An example of this structure is training A to B and B to C.  The node serves as the 
comparison in one conditional discrimination and as the sample in the next.  The equivalence 
literature treats each of these training structures as “equally likely to produce emergent 
performances when the number of nodes equals one” (Saunders, Saunders, Williams, & Spradlin, 
1993).  However some studies have shown that with different populations and under different 
conditions some structures prove to be more effective than others. 
 Saunders, Drake, and Spradlin (1999) looked at training structure differences with 
normally developing preschool children.  They compared many-to-one (CaN) and one-to-many 
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(SaN) procedures in five-member equivalence classes. The number of sessions required to learn 
the conditional discriminations in the one-to-many (SaN) group ranged from 11 to 74 sessions, 
with an average of 24.  The sessions required for the children trained with the many-to-one 
(CaN) ranged from 22 to 48 with an average of 37.  Only 2 of the 6 children trained with one-to-
many (SaN) structure showed equivalence classes, while all of the children trained with the 
many-to-one (CaN) structure showed equivalence. 
 A study by Fields, Hobbie-Reeve, Adams, and Reeve (1999) compared one-to-many 
(SaN) and many-to-one (CaN) training structure with normal adults across 5 and 7 member 
classes.  Results showed that those trained with many-to-one (CaN) structure required more trials 
before showing acquisition.  All subjects eventually showed formation of equivalence classes.  
However, with the seven-member classes, the relations were much slower to emerge following 
one-to-many (SaN) training than with many-to-one (CaN) training.  This effect has also been 
found in 8 to 14 year olds (Saunders et al., 1993). 
 The many-to-one (CaN) structure has also proven more effective with subjects with mild 
mental retardation.  Spradlin and Saunders (1986) found that mentally retarded subjects trained 
with many-to-one (CaN) performed at or near 100% correct on equivalence probes, while those 
trained with one-to-many (SaN) performed at best 70%.  Saunders et al. (1993) looked at the 
effects of instructions on training structure with mildly retarded adolescents and adults.  They 
found that instructions facilitate performance with those trained with many-to-one (CaN) 
structure but not in one-to-many (SaN).   
EQUIVALENCE CLASSES AND CATEGORIZATION 
 An important question is whether or not equivalence classes represent a good model for 
studying natural language classes. Some critics of this approach have argued that equivalence 
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research is not relevant to language categories because the classes formed are based on arbitrary 
relations, unlike language. The relation between the word and the “referent” is arbitrary.  For 
example, the word “tree” is not the only word that represents this object.  The words “arbol” and 
“baum” also represent this same object even though there is no physical or perceptual relation 
between these words.  This single, symbolic relation is very much like an equivalence relation.  
However, the objects included in the “tree class,” like maples, oaks, and palms, are not arbitrary.  
They share some perceptual features, which allow classification of novel stimuli.  Training 
equivalence classes in which stimuli  share perceptual features would result in equivalence 
classes that are better models of natural language classes. 
An aspect of language that makes categories so powerful is that novel things are 
responded to in adaptive ways. For example, seeing a picture of a shark is enough to help you 
identify a real live shark in a novel situation.  In addition, learning about the potential danger of a 
shark will likely lead to your avoidance of a shark in novel situations.  Even though you have 
never seen a real shark, the picture and information you previously learned will transfer to other 
situations.   For example, if someone screams shark at the beach, this word alone is enough to 
warrant action.  Language helps us to adapt and act appropriately in new situations.  Most 
arbitrary relations that are learned in equivalence classes are unlike language because nothing 
beyond the single relation is learned.  That is, the arbitrary relations do not generalize to novel 
examples.  Equivalence classes are thought by some to lack this strong and powerful property 
and therefore have not always been considered a good model of language classes (Harnad, 1996). 
In consideration of some of these arguments, Fields, Reeve, Adams and Verhave (1991) 
looked at effects of generalization of line lengths on equivalence classes.  They trained nonsense 
syllables to a long line and a short line.  After equivalence classes were established, 
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generalization was tested by using six variations of the short line and six variations of the long 
line.  Generalization to the novel line lengths was shown by all subjects.  For example, once 
subjects were trained to match a 3cm short line to a nonsense syllable, they also matched other 
lengths of short lines (2cm and 4cm) to the same nonsense syllable.  This generalization 
demonstrated the possible open-endedness of equivalence classes.  However, this study still lacks 
the evidence needed to show equivalence classes as good models of language.  Although this 
study was successful is showing some degree of generalization, Harnad may argue that a 
category of simple lines cannot be compared to a complex lexical categories.  There is quite a 
difference between being able to respond identically to different line lengths and being able to 
respond identically to more complex stimuli.  For example, the lines only differed on one 
dimension, the length, while stimuli in many natural categories can differ on many more then 
one dimension (e.g. length of hair, color of hair, height, weight).  Consider a comparison 
between a German Shepard and a Chihuahua. While both may be responded to as members of 
the dog category, it is not clear that simple stimulus generalization can account for this. 
Galizio, Stewart, and Pilgrim (in review) sought to train subjects with a stimulus set  that 
would result in the formation of equivalence classes that shared more properties with natural 
language classes.  Particularly, they wanted to address the problem of generalized equivalence 
classes and how abstraction can be used to categorize. They also wanted to determine whether 
typicality effects could be observed in equivalence-class members. They used stimuli that varied 
on more than one dimension to make them more complex then simple lines.   
Adult subjects learned a total of eight conditional discriminations during baseline 
training.  A nonsense syllable (A-jom, wug, or niz) served as the sample and was trained with 
abstract comparison stimuli with different combinations of features (B-I).  The stimuli in Figure 
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1 show that the comparison stimuli had a number of features, but only four of the features were 
relevant.  The B set of stimuli had all four relevant features.  These included the base, 
appendages, insert, and fill.  Each class (wug, jom, or niz) included a particular variant of these 
four class-consistent features.  For example, the Jom class had a diamond base, squiggly 
appendages, straight lines insert, and dot fill. The C and D stimuli had three of the relevant 
features, which included the base, insert and appendages or the fill, appendages, and the insert.  
The E stimuli had two of the relevant features, which included the appendages and the fill.  The 
F, G, H, and I stimuli had only one relevant feature, either the base, appendages, insert, or fill.  
Each stimulus also included a number of irrelevant features.  The irrelevant features were 
counterbalanced 
Class 1        Class 2      Class 3 
A     WUG               JOM               NIZ  
B 
(4F) 
 
C 
(3F-BIA) 
 
D 
(3F-IFA) 
 
E 
(2F-BF) 
 
 
F 
(1F-B) 
 
G 
(1F-I) 
 
H 
(1F-F) 
 
I 
(1F-A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Stimulus set used during baseline training, symmetry, and transitivity probes.
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across classes so that relevant features were shared with class members and irrelevant 
features were found on members from all three classes.  Subject’s responses were 
reinforced only when they picked the comparison with the class-consistent features.  For 
example, when A1 (wug) was the sample, a response choosing B1, C1, D1, E1, F1, G1, 
H1 or I1 was reinforced.  Through baseline training, subjects learned that these 
contingencies defined each of the classes.  Subjects continued baseline training until 
meeting criteria (22/24) on two consecutive blocks of trials.  Reinforcement was 
gradually reduced, from 100% to eventually 50%, to prepare subjects for upcoming 
unreinforced probe trials.  
After baseline training, subjects were exposed to probe trials, including tests for 
symmetry and transitivity.  Symmetry trials would present the abstract stimuli (B-I) as 
samples and the trigrams as comparisons (A).  Transitivity trials would present the 
abstract stimuli (B-I) as samples as well as comparisons.  Probe trials also included novel 
probes which presented new combinations of features not before seen by subjects.  Trials 
presented the tri-gram as the sample and a stimulus with a new combination of features as 
the comparison.  The only way to identify this novel stimulus was to pay attention to the 
relevant features learned during baseline training.  Lastly, subjects were given cards with 
pictures of all the stimuli and were asked to sort them into three groups and then to rate 
them from the one they thought most represented the category to the one they thought 
was least representative.   
Analysis of probe trials provided evidence that all subjects had formed 
generalized equivalence classes.  Symmetry probes were responded to with 94 to 100% 
accuracy.  Transitivity probes ranged from 90-100% accurate and novel probes had 98-
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100% class-consistent responding.  While the symmetry and transitivity probes were 
important in showing equivalence classes had formed, the novel probes were of particular 
interest.  The subjects’ class-consistent responding to novel probes suggested that the 
behavior had come under the control of the relevant features, permitting class- 
appropriate responding to stimuli never presented in training. 
Typicality effects were found by analyzing errors and latencies.  Galizio et al. 
found that subjects made more errors with one-and two-feature stimuli than with three-
and four-feature stimuli in baseline training.  Also, latencies were longer for one-and 
two-feature stimuli.  That is, three-and four-feature stimuli were responded to more 
quickly.  In sorting tests administered after testing, subjects rated four-feature stimuli as 
most representative and one-feature stimuli as least representative members of their 
classes.   
These findings are thought to be strong evidence of the validity of equivalence 
classes as models of natural language classes for several reasons. Galizio et al. directly 
trained 8 conditional discriminations.  Through symmetry and transitivity 54 more 
relations emerged and three eight-member equivalence classes were demonstrated.  
Novel probes indicated that another 51 stimuli were class members, implying that these 
classes were open-ended in nature.  As long as a stimulus possessed one or more of the 
relevant features, it was included in the class.  These findings seem to closely model the 
powerful generalization that occurs in natural language classes. 
 However, the results from the previous study were obtained using a one-to-many, 
or sample-as-comparison training structure.  The trigrams were always used as the 
sample, with each of the combinations of features of the abstract stimuli as comparisons.  
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As mentioned before, there is some evidence that training structure affects acquisition 
and equivalence-class formation.  Another important point to consider is the possible 
effect of a word-like trigram in the training structure.  Horne and Lowe might argue that 
because equivalence comes from naming, a word, or a name, as a node might have been 
essential in a subject’s acquisition of the complex classes.  On the other hand, theories 
such as Sidman (2000) would argue that the same results would be found with or without 
the use of trigrams as nodal stimuli. 
An additional issue in the Galizio et al. study is the role of the instructions.  
Behavior in many situations seems to be greatly influenced by instructions.  Early studies 
of human operant behavior found unusual differences between studies with minimal and 
extensive instructions.  Instructions have proved to be a very important part in developing 
and controlling human behavior (Baron & Galizio, 1983).  The instructions used in the 
Galizio et al. study were fairly explicit.  For example, the subject was instructed to “select 
the object that goes with the syllable in the center of the screen and click on it,” and to 
respond as rapidly as possible.  In many equivalence studies, minimal instructions are 
used to ensure performance is due to contingencies and not instructions (Pilgrim & 
Galizio, 1990; Pilgrim & Galizio, 1995).  For example, the subject is instructed to simply 
pick one of the comparisons and is not informed to respond in a certain time.  Thus, the 
Galizio et al. instructions provided more detail as to how to respond and the 
consequences of responding.  There is a possibility that these detailed instructions were 
necessary to produce the effects found. 
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PURPOSE OF PRESENT STUDY 
 The present series of experiment were systematic replications of the Galizio et al. 
study with different training structures and instructions.  The experiments examined the 
effects of training structure and instructions on typicality effects and the formation of 
generalized equivalence classes. Additionally, the role of tri-gram naming was examined 
by taking it out of the sample position.  Experiment 1 was conducted to see if a many-to-
one training structure, the reverse of the Galizio et al. study, would produce changes in 
acquisition, the formation of equivalence classes, and typicality effects.  Thus, the 
samples in this experiment could be any of the one, two, three, or four feature abstract 
shapes and the comparisons were always one of the three trigrams. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Participants 
 There were 8 participants in Experiment 1.  The participants were undergraduate 
students from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington.  Participants received 
credit to fulfill course requirements in psychology classes. 
Apparatus 
 Participants were individually trained and tested on color Macintosh computers in 
a quiet room. Match-to-sample software, developed by Dube (1991), was used.  Stimuli 
consisted of black nonsense trigrams approximately 0.75 X 2.0 cm in size and color 
abstract objects.  (See Figures 1-3).  The abstract stimuli were approximately 4.0 X 4.0 
cm in size. 
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Class 1        Class 2      Class 3 
A     WUG               JOM               NIZ  
J 
(1F-B) 
 
K 
(1F-F) 
 
L 
(1F-I) 
 
M 
(1F-A) 
 
N 
(2F-FB) 
 
O 
(2F-FA) 
 
P 
(2F-IB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Stimulus set used in unequal-feature probe trials. 
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Class 1        Class 2      Class 3 
A     WUG               JOM               NIZ  
Q 
(2F-IA) 
R 
(3F-IAB) 
S 
(3F-FIA) 
T 
(3F-FIB) 
U 
(3F-FAB) 
V 
(4F-FIAB) 
W 
(1A) 
 
X 
(1I) 
 
Y 
(1F) 
 
Z 
(1B) 
 
AA 
(2FB) 
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BB 
(2IA) 
CC 
(2IB) 
DD 
(2FA) 
EE 
(3IAB) 
 
FF 
(3FIA) 
 
GG 
(3FIB) 
 
HH 
(3FAB) 
 
II 
(4FIAB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Stimulus set used in equal-feature probe trials.
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Stimulus Set 
Subjects were trained with nonsense syllables (Row A in Figure 1) and abstract 
stimuli (Rows B-I in Figure 1).  Figure 1 shows that the abstract stimuli (B-I) differed 
along eight dimensions.  Four of these dimensions, or features, were relevant and class-
consistent.  These features were the fill, insert, appendages and base.  Training stimuli 
could have one, two, three, or four of these features. For example, the prototype stimulus 
(Row B in Figure 1) had all four relevant features. On the other hand, some of the 
training stimuli had only one of the relevant features (Rows F-I in Figure 1).  For 
example, Row F in Figure 1 shows the one-feature stimuli with the relevant base.  Note 
that the base is found on stimuli in Rows B, C, and E, but, like all the relevant features, 
the bases are class consistent.  That is, class one has a different base from class two,  
which has a different base from class three.  The irrelevant features were the shape of the 
figure, position of the base, the color of the inner circle, and the color of the outer shading 
around the inner circle.  The irrelevant features were distributed quasi-randomly among 
classes to ensure they are not the basis for correct responding.  Like the relevant features, 
the irrelevant features had three variants, and each of these appeared two or three times in 
Class 1 (Wug), Class 2 (Jom) and Class 3 (Niz).  For example, as seen in Figure 1, the 
yellow/orange outer shading and the purple inner circle color can be seen in all three 
classes. 
Procedure 
The procedure included four phases. First, participants completed a pre-sorting 
task.  Next, participants received baseline training and probe trials.  Finally, participants 
completed the sorting task again and also rated the stimuli.
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Pre-Sort Task 
 The pre-sort task was conducted to see how subjects would categorize stimuli 
without conditional discrimination training.  This task determined what properties of the 
stimuli controlled categorizing before training. Subjects were presented with three sheets 
of paper with one of the tri-grams (Jom, Wug, Niz) printed at the top middle of each 
page.  They were also given cards with pictures of each of the abstract stimuli to be used 
in training (as in Figure 1).  Participants were asked to sort the cards into three groups, in 
any way that they deemed appropriate.  Subjects’ responses were recorded by the 
experimenter. 
Baseline Training   
Subjects were read the following instructions: 
Please read these instructions along with me as I read them out loud. 
This is an experiment in learning – it is not a psychological test.  We are 
investigating certain aspects of the learning process that are common to all 
people. 
More specifically, we are interested in finding out how many points you will be 
able to make on a learning task.  In other words, your job in this experiment will 
be to make as many points as you can.  The way in which you can make points 
works like this: 
When this experiment begins, a stimulus figure will appear in the center of the 
screen.  The stimulus in the center of the screen will always be the example 
stimulus.  After you have looked at the example stimulus in the center of the 
screen, use the mouse to position the cursor on it and click.  Other stimuli will 
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appear on the screen.  These are your choices.  You should use the mouse to select 
the object that goes with the stimulus in the center of the screen and click on it. 
Sometimes after your choice, colored stars will appear on the screen accompanied 
by music.  Each time this occurs, 1 point is added to your total score.  However,   
sometimes you will hear a buzzer, and this will subtract 1 point from your score.  
Also, please note that on some trials there will be no feedback (no stars or buzzer) 
to tell you if you’ve made the correct choice. 
We are also interested in how rapidly you can make your choice.  In the 
beginning, you will not know which choice is correct.  However, once you learn 
which objects go together, it is essential that you make your choice as quickly as 
you can. 
If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.  I will not be able to 
answer any questions or make any comments once we’ve begun. 
Again, remember that your job is to earn stars as often as you can. 
  Baseline training began following the subject’s completion of the instructions.  
Baseline training consisted of many-to-one (CaN) training.  One of the abstract stimuli, 
either a four (Row B, Figure 1), three (Rows C and D in Figure 1), two (Row E in Figure 
1), or one-feature shape (Rows F-I in Figure 1) was presented as the sample. In this 
experiment, the comparisons were always the three trigrams (Row A in Figure 1).   An 
example of a trial would present a shape with a diamond base as the sample (e.g., 
Stimulus F2) and the trigrams Jom (A2), Wug (A1), and Niz (A3), as the comparisons.  
When the trial began, subjects first had to click on the sample stimulus. So, to use 
the example from above, stimulus F2 would appear and subjects were required to click on 
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it.  This served as the observing response and prompted the trigrams to appear in three of 
the four corners of the screen. Participants then clicked on one of the comparisons.   
Comparison locations were randomized.  Correct  responses, which were reinforced, were 
followed by stars flashing on the screen and a jingle. So, for this example, selecting the 
trigram Jom (A2) would produce reinforcement.  Selections of Wug  (A1) or Niz (A3)  
would be incorrect responses, and the subject would hear a buzzer.  After each trial, the 
screen went blank for a 1.5 sec inter-trial interval.   
As Figure 1 shows, only eight of the possible fifteen arrangements of the four 
relevant features were used for training.  Using these arrangements ensured that each 
relevant feature was presented an equal number of times.  The three-feature stimuli were 
presented in two combinations.  As Figure 1 shows, the C set included base, appendages, 
and insert, and the D set included appendages, insert, and fill.  The two-feature stimuli, as 
seen in Figure 1, appeared in just one combination of the base and fill.  Figure 1 also 
shows that each of the features served as a one-feature stimulus.  The F set had the 
relevant base, the G set had the relevant insert, the H set had the relevant fill, and the I set 
had the relevant appendages.   
Training was arranged in blocks of 24 trials.  Figure 1 shows all the trial types 
used in training where each of the stimuli in Rows B-I served as the samples with the 
trigrams as comparisons (Row A in Figure 1).  Responding to the trigram with the class 
number corresponding to the sample was reinforced (e.g., given B1 as a sample, choosing 
A1 was reinforced).  Each block contained one of each of the possible trial types in 
random order.  The comparisons were presented in a randomized order with no position 
containing the correct comparison for more than two consecutive trials.  The sample 
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stimulus was never the same on two consecutive trials, and one of the four possible 
positions was never reinforced more than twice in a row.  Subjects cycled through 
training blocks until the mastery criterion (22/24) was met on two consecutive blocks.  
Two additional baseline trial blocks were presented with reduced reinforcement to 
prepare subjects for upcoming unreinforced test trials. Subjects were required to meet 
criteria (22/24) on a block with 75% reinforcement, where 6 of the trials were randomly 
chosen to be non-reinforced, and a block with 50% reinforcement, where 12 trials were 
randomly chosen to be non-reinforced. Mastery of these two reduced reinforcement 
blocks allowed subjects to move to the next phase in the experiment. 
 Probe Trials 
  Following acquisition of baseline conditional discriminations, probe trials were 
introduced.  Probe trials tested the properties of symmetry and transitivity, as well as 
generalized control by class-consistent features.  Each trial block consisted of only one 
type of probe and was intermixed with baseline trials.   
 Symmetry trial blocks contained a total of 48 trials composed of 24 baseline trials 
and 24 probe trials.  The 24 symmetry trial types were each presented once for a total of 
24 probe trials.  Responses on symmetry trials were never reinforced, thus, an overall 
block reinforcement rate of 50% was maintained.  Symmetry trials presented a structure 
opposite that of the baseline training in that they presented one the tri-grams (A) as the 
sample, and the comparisons were either four-feature prototype stimuli (e.g., B1, B2 and 
B3), three-feature stimuli (from Rows C and D of Figure 1), two-feature stimuli (Row E) 
or one-feature stimuli (Rows F-I).  
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Transitivity trials involved one of the abstract shapes (from rows B-I of Figure 1) 
presented as the sample and three others as comparisons.   During baseline training these 
shapes had never served as comparisons, but were potentially the nodal trigram stimuli 
(A1, A2 and A3).  These nodal stimuli, the trigrams,  did not appear on transitivity trials..  
An example of a transitivity trial type would be a one-feature shape with the base 
(Stimulus F1in Figure 1) as the sample and the comparisons would be the three-feature 
shapes with insert, pattern, and appendages (Stimuli D1, D2, and D3 in Figure 1). The 
transitivity trials only included trials that did not allow for identity matching with critical 
features.  So, if a sample was a two-feature shape with a relevant base and fill (Stimulus 
E1 in Figure 1), a comparison might be the one-feature shape with the relevant insert 
(Stimulus G1 in Figure 1) or the one-feature shape with relevant appendages (Stimulus I1 
in Figure 1).  In this case, comparisons would not include the one-feature shape with a 
relevant base (Stimulus F1in Figure 1) or the one-feature shape with a relevant fill 
(Stimulus H1 in Figure 1) because this would allow subjects to identity match features. 
Transitivity trial blocks included 24 probe trials and 24 baseline trials.  Again, a 50% 
reinforcement density was maintained due to the non-reinforced transitivity trials. 
  To test for generalization of class-consistent features, novel probes were used.  
Figure 2 shows that some of these probes included novel stimuli with new combinations 
of relevant and irrelevant features. Like the training stimuli, these novel examples varied 
in number of features and will be referred to as unequal-feature feature probes. As seen in 
Figure 2, these novel stimuli included new combinations of irrelevant features.  For 
example, Stimulus O1 in Figure 2 shows a stimulus with a new color combination.  This 
stimulus has a rainbow color in the outer area surrounding the inner circle that subjects 
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had never seen before.  In order for subjects to match these trials in a class-consistent 
manner, they must ignore these new examples of the irrelevant features, and respond to 
the relevant features they learned in baseline training.  Note that Stimulus O1 in Figure 2  
has a relevant fill and relevant appendages that would allow the subject to match class 
consistently.  Trials were similar to baseline trials except that reinforcement was not 
provided.  In these novel trials the abstract stimuli that served as samples were replaced 
with novel examples.    An example of this trial type would present an unequal-feature 
feature stimulus as the sample (Stimulus P1 in Figure 2) and the trigrams (A1, A2, and 
A3 in Figure 1) would be the comparisons.  Trial blocks included 20 unequal-feature 
probe trials, 18 reinforced baseline trials and 6 non-reinforced baseline trials to maintain 
a reinforcement density of 50%.    
To control for stimulus complexity of novel probes, a second set of novel probes 
was created.  These stimuli, known as equal-feature probes and shown in Figure 3, 
assured an equal number of features for each stimulus by adding irrelevant variants of the 
relevant features to four, three, two, and one-feature probe stimuli. For example, Figure 3 
shows a one-feature stimulus may have a class-consistent insert, but would also have a 
irrelevant base, appendages, and fill. An example of this shape is Stimulus X1 in Figure 
3.  This new set of novel stimuli varied in the number of class-consistent features, but 
were equal in terms of complexity, i.e., they all had eight features.  As seen in Figure 3, 
Stimulus X1, although it has only one relevant feature, does not differ from Stimulus II1, 
which has all four of the relevant features, in terms of complexity.  Since these features 
were irrelevant, they can be seen in all three classes as Figure 3 shows.  An example of 
this trial type would include an equal-feature stimulus (Stimulus T1 in Figure 3) as a 
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sample and the trigrams as comparisons (A1, A2, and A3 in Figure 1).  Trial blocks 
included 20 equal-feature probe trials, 18 reinforced baseline trials and six non-reinforced 
baseline trials to maintain a reinforcement density of 50%.    
Subjects cycled through the following sequence of probe-trial blocks: one trial 
block of Novel Probes (Unequal-Feature), one trial block of Novel Probes (Equal-
Feature), one trial block of Novel Probes (Unequal-Feature), one trial block of Novel 
Probes (Equal-Feature), 2 trial blocks of symmetry, 2 trial  blocks of transitivity, one trial 
block of Novel Probes (Unequal-Feature), one trial block of Novel Probes (Equal-
Feature), one trial block of Novel Probes (Unequal-Feature), one trial block of Novel 
Probes (Equal-Feature).  The subject continued this sequence until it was completed or 
until their 50-min session was up.  At the beginning of every session the subject started at 
the beginning of the program with the baseline trials blocks. 
Post-Sort Task 
Upon completion of the computer task in the final session, subjects were given a 
sorting task identical to the one administered prior to training.  Subjects were given the 
pictures of the stimuli and the three sheets of paper with the trigrams at the top and were 
asked to sort the pictures of the stimuli in three groups. However, after sorting, they were 
asked to rate each of the stimuli within each group.  Subjects were asked to arrange the 
stimuli in order starting with the most representative of the category, which was given a 
rating of 8, and ending with the least representative of the category, which was given a 
rating of 1.  Subjects’ responses were recorded by the experimenter.  
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Results 
Acquisition  
Number of trials required to meet criterion ranged from 192 to 912.  Total number 
of trials and errors during acquisition are shown in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, it took 
subjects an average of 520 trials to meet acquisition criteria.  Additionally, subjects made 
an average of 233 errors.  The possibility of a typicality effect in acquisition was assessed 
by analyzing errors made on different trial types as a function of number of relevant 
features.  The number of trials correct was summed for each of the trials containing one, 
two, three, or four-feature stimuli.  Because subjects had no basis for matching on the 
first block of trials, errors made on the initial trial block were not included in this sum.  
The sums were then divided by the total number of trials for each feature number 
producing a percent correct score (correct trials/correct trials + error trials).  For example, 
if a subject had 100 trials with one-feature stimuli and got 84 of the trials correct then 
they would have a score 84/100 or 84% correct.  A typicality effect would be indicated 
by a direct relation between percent correct and number of relevant features.  Figure 4 
shows something of a typicality effect with higher percent correct scores for trials 
containing three and four-feature shapes than for trials with one and two-feature shapes.  
A single-factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed statistical significance [F (3,21)=5.8, 
p<.01] of this typicality effect.  A Tukey’s post hoc test confirmed that the One-feature 
and Two-Feature condition  were significantly different from the Four-Feature condition 
but were not significantly different from each other (p<.05).  Also, the Two-Feature 
condition was significantly different from the Three-Feature condition (p<.05).   Table 1  
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Table 1. 
 
Number of trials required to meet criterion, total errors and percent correct on baseline 
errors by number of features for subjects in Experiment 1. 
 
Subject Trials Errors 
%correct 
1F 
%correct 
2F 
%correct 
3F 
%correct 
4F 
I-1 479 177 80 82 93 95 
       
I-2 784 366 57 28 96 100 
       
I-3 912 345 67 67 91 87 
       
I-4 192 73 91 95 96 97 
       
I-5 620 366 67 64 84 85 
       
I-6 432 225 79 85 87 87 
       
I-7 552 216 78 80 93 95 
       
I-8 192 97 90 92 92 88 
Mean 520.34 233.13 76.13 74.13 91.5 91.75 
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Figure 4.  Percent correct on baseline errors for each number of features for subjects in 
Experiment 1. 
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shows that these effects were evident at the level of individual subjects, with seven out of 
eight subjects showing a higher percentage correct on four-feature trials than on one-
feature trials.  Only subject  # I-8 failed to show more errors as the number of features 
increased. 
Baseline Reaction Times 
Reaction times, which measured the amount of time from the presentation of the 
comparison stimuli to the subject’s response, were summed independently for trials with 
comparisons of each feature number.  These sums were divided by the total number of 
trials in order to assess typicality effects on reaction time.  Reaction times for initial trial 
blocks as well as incorrect trials were not included.  To reduce the skew of the reaction 
time distribution, a reciprocal transformation was used to convert reaction time to speed 
scores. 
Figure 5 presents baseline speed scores for sessions 1 and 2.  Session 3 speed 
scores were excluded based on past findings from Galizio et al. that showed that by 
session 3 subjects’ response speeds had reached asymptote, and that typicality effects 
thus dissipated.  As Figure 5 shows, responding on one and four-feature stimuli was 
slightly slower than responding on two and three-feature stimuli, but there was 
considerable variability.  This finding is not indicative of a typicality effect. Closer 
examination of individual speed scores, as shown in Table 2, reveal little variation within 
subjects.  Subjects # I-5 and # I-7 appear to be the only subjects that may have shown 
typicality effects, with relatively slow responding to one-feature stimuli.  However, most 
subjects did not respond significantly faster on trials with three and four-feature stimuli 
than on one and two-feature stimuli trials.     A single-factor within-subjects ANOVA  
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Figure 5.  Mean speed scores on baseline trials for each number of features for subjects in 
Experiment 1. 
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Table 2. 
 
Speed scores for baseline trials and unequal and equal probe trials for subjects in 
Experiment 1. 
 
 Baseline Trials          Equal Probe Trials       Unequal Probe Trials 
Subject 1F 2F 3F 4F 1F 2F 3F 4F 1F 2F 3F 4F 
I-1 0.45 0.4 0.5 0.43 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.7 0.91 0.67 0.63 
             
I-2 0.83 0.8 0.9 0.59 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.77 0.6 0.83 0.91 0.83 
             
I-3 0.56 0.6 0.6 0.59 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.56 0.5 0.45 0.63 0.56 
             
I-4 0.67 0.7 0.6 0.63 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.71 0.7 0.71 0.67 0.67 
             
I-5 0.59 0.6 0.8 0.77 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.91 0.7 0.67 0.83 0.77 
             
I-6 0.91 0.9 0.8 0.83 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.91 0.8 0.91 0.91 0.83 
             
I-7 0.77 0.9 0.9 0.91 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.83 0.8 0.91 0.91 0.83 
             
I-8 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.5 0.48 0.48 0.45 
Mean 0.65 0.7 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.73 0.7 0.73 0.75 0.7 
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confirmed that there was no significant effect of Features on baseline speeds [F 
(3,21)=1.92, p>.05]. 
Probe Trials 
Performances on symmetry probes and transitivity probes demonstrated the formation of 
equivalence classes for all of the subjects.  As shown in Table 3, symmetry performances 
ranged from 94% to 100% correct with an average of 98% correct. Transitivity 
performances averaged 98% correct and ranged from 96% to 100% correct.  All but two 
of the subjects who formed equivalence classes also matched class-consistently on 
unequal-feature and equal-feature probe trials.  Table 3 shows unequal-feature probe 
performances ranged from 75% to 100% correct and equal-feature probe performances 
ranged from 76% to 100% correct, both with an average of 90% correct.  Thus, six of the 
eight subjects included novel stimuli with one or more relevant features in the class even 
though they were not directly trained during baseline trials.  Subjects # I-2 and # I-5 did 
not show this trend.  Although they had high scores on symmetry and transitivity trials, 
their scores on the unequal-feature probe trials did not reflect the same level of mastery.  
Their scores show that they were responding above chance.  This pattern of scoring likely 
suggests that these subjects were missing one type of trials. 
Probe trials were also assessed for typicality effects.  Individual speed scores, 
shown in Table 2, seem to follow a trend similar to the baseline speed scores in that most 
subjects do not show patterns consistent with typicality effects.  Figure 6 shows that 
subjects responded at more or less comparable speeds regardless of feature number on 
both unequal-feature and equal-feature probes.  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA  
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Table 3. 
 
Percent correct on probe trials for subjects in Experiment 1. 
 
Subject Unequal Equal Symmetry Transitivity 
I-1 92 90 100 98 
     
I-2 75 79 96 100 
     
I-3 97 97 100 96 
     
I-4 100 100 100 100 
     
I-5 77 76 94 96 
     
I-6 93 91 99 98 
     
I-7 91 90 96 96 
     
I-8 97 97 100 100 
Mean 90.25 90 98.13 98 
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Figure 6.  Mean speed scores on novel probe trials for each number of features for 
subjects in Experiment 1. 
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verified there was no typicality effects on unequal-feature probe trials [F (3,21)=2.72, 
p>.05]. 
Sort and Rating Task 
As seen in Table 4, all the subjects sorted in a class-consistent way on the post-
sort task, with an average of 99% class consistent.  This was a dramatic improvement 
over 38% class-consistent during the pre-sort task. 
For the rating task, rankings of the trained stimuli were weighted (i.e., 8=most 
typical; 1=least typical) for each subject and summed across classes at each level of 
feature number.  The sum for each feature number was than divided by the total number 
of stimuli included for that level (i.e., 3 four-feature, 6 three-feature, 3 two-feature, and 
12 one-feature stimuli), producing a mean typicality rating.  Mean ratings are shown in 
Figure 7 and indicate a strong typicality effect.  Subjects’ ratings of the stimuli increased 
as the number of relevant features increased.  A single-factor within-subjects ANOVA 
confirmed a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=50.94, p<.01]. A Tukey’s post hoc test  
found the One-Feature and Two-Feature Groups to be significantly different from the 
Three-Feature and Four-Feature Groups. as well as a significant difference between the 
Three-Feature and Four-Feature Group (p>.05). 
Discussion 
To summarize the results of Experiment 1, the formation of equivalence classes 
was demonstrated through high levels of performance on symmetry and transitivity tests 
in all eight subjects.  Performances on novel probes showed that not all subjects had 
formed generalized equivalence classes; however, six of the eight subjects did show 
categorization of novel stimuli according to the features that were relevant in baseline  
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Table 4. 
 
Sort scores and ratings for subjects in Experiment 1. 
 
Subject 
Pre-
sort 
Post-
sort 
1-
Feature 
2-
Feature 
3-
Feature 
4-
Feature 
I-1 38 100 3 4.7 6.2 7 
       
I-2 38 96 3.8 5.7 4.7 6 
       
I-3 38 100 2.8 4 6.5 8 
       
I-4 38 100 2.5 5 7 7 
       
I-5 38 96 2.3 4 7.2 6.7 
       
I-6 37 100 2 3.7 5.2 7.3 
       
I-7 38 100 2.2 3 7 7 
       
I-8 38 100 2.5 5 6.5 8 
Mean 37.89 99 2.64 4.39 6.29 7.13 
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Figure 7.  Mean post sort ratings for each number of features for subjects in Experiment 
1. 
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training. Thus, a many-to-one training structure can produce generalized equivalence 
classes using the Galizio et al. “family resemblance” procedures. Typicality effects were 
not as robust  as in the Galizio et al. study, which used one-to-many training.  In the 
present study, typicality effects were found only in the analysis of baseline errors and the 
post-sort rating task.  That is, subjects made significantly more errors on baseline trials 
that contained one and two-feature stimuli than on baseline trials with three and four-
feature stimuli.  In the rating task, subjects rated the one-feature stimuli as least typical of 
the category, the two-feature stimuli as the next to least typical, the three-feature stimuli 
as the next to most typical, and the four-feature stimuli as the most typical of the 
category.  While these results parallel more closely  the findings of Galizio et al., other 
findings differed in that typicality effects were not found in the latencies of baseline or 
probe trials.   
The results of Experiment 1 showed that equivalence classes were acquired with a 
many-to-one training structure.  Thus, it appears that the trigram does not have to be the 
sample in order for subjects to show equivalence.  However, no typicality effects as a 
function of latencies were found.  This finding requires further exploration of whether 
this was due to the many-to-one training structure or due to the absence of the trigram in 
the sample position.  Results from the Galizio et al. study and the present study show that 
when the trigram is the sample or the node, generalized equivalence is acquired (although 
it should be noted that this was less consistent in Experiment 1). However, in both these 
studies the trigram served as the nodal stimulus, whether as sample (Galizio et al.) or as 
comparison (Experiment 1).  The next step would be to remove the trigram from the 
nodal position completely.  In Experiment 2, a one-to-many training structure was used, 
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but the sample was replaced with the prototype (four-feature stimulus) of each category.  
The comparisons included the trigrams, but also included all the other abstract shapes 
( the three, two, and one-feature shapes—see Figure 1). 
Experiment 2 also addressed the question of the role of instructions.  In the 
Galizio et al. study detailed instructions were used to facilitate the acquisition of the large 
number of baseline conditional discriminations in the short period of time the subjects 
were available to the experimenters.  In Experiment 1, these same detailed instructions 
were used.  In both studies, the subjects learned the conditional discriminations fairly 
readily.  Experiment 2 used the detailed instructions, but also studied a group that 
received more minimal instructions to see if any group differences would be found.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
Participants 
 There were 16 participants in Experiment 2.  The participants were undergraduate 
students from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington.  Participants received 
credit to fulfill course requirements in psychology classes. 
Procedure 
 Experiment 2 employed the same general procedure as Experiment 1.  This 
experiment differed in terms of the instructions given to the subjects.  A minimal set of 
instructions was introduced in this experiment.  Procedures for baseline training and 
probe tests differed from Experiment 1 only in the training structure that was presented.   
 Instructions 
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 Half (eight) of the subjects in Experiment 2 were given the same detailed 
instructions used in the Experiment 1.  The remaining eight subjects were read the 
following minimal instructions: 
Please read these instructions along with me as I read them out loud. 
This is an experiment in learning – it is not a psychological test.  We are 
investigating certain aspects of the learning process that are common to all 
people. 
When this experiment begins, you are going to see a picture in the middle of the 
screen.  Use the mouse to move the cursor to the picture and click on it.  When 
you click, you’re going to see three other pictures in the corners of the screen.  
These are your choices.  Please pick one and click on it. 
Sometimes after your choice, colored stars will appear on the screen.  Sometimes 
you will hear a buzzer.  Your job is to earn stars as often as you can, but please 
note that on some trials there will be no feedback (no stars or buzzer) to tell you if 
you’ve made the correct choice. 
If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.  I will not be able to 
answer any questions or make any comments once we’ve begun. 
Again, remember that your job is to earn stars as often as you can. 
Pre and post-sort task 
Procedures for the pre-sort task and post-sort task were the same as in Experiment 
1. 
Baseline training 
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One of the three prototypes (four-feature stimuli, see Stimuli B in Figure 1) was 
always presented as the sample. Otherwise, training trial types and other procedures were 
the same as Experiment 1 except that one of the comparison sets included the three 
trigrams.   
Probe trials 
Subjects followed the same probe sequence (novel, symmetry, and transitivity) as 
in Experiment 1 after mastering baseline conditional discriminations.  The sample on 
symmetry trials was always one of the stimuli used as comparisons in training, including 
the trigrams.  The comparisons were always the prototypes. 
On transitivity trials, subjects matched the trigrams and the three, two, and one-
feature shapes.  There were no prototype stimuli presented in the transitivity trials.  The 
sample and comparisons could be any of the trigrams, three, two, or one-feature stimuli.  
Again, trials that permitted feature-identity matching were not included. 
Unequal-feature and equal-feature novel probe trials followed the same structure 
as baseline trials in that a prototype was always the sample.  However, the comparisons 
were novel examples of the four, three, two, or one-feature stimuli (see Figures 2 & 3).  
Trigrams were not included in these trial types because there are no novel examples of 
them. 
Results 
Acquisition  
Total number of trials and errors during acquisition are shown in Table 5. As table 
5 shows, number of trials required to meet criteria on baselines ranged from 48 to 733. 
Subjects in the Minimal Instruction Group required an average of 69 trials to meet  
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Table 5.  
 
Number of trials to meet criterion, total errors and percent correct on baseline errors by 
number of features for subjects in Experiment 2. 
 
Subject Trials Errors 
%correct 
0F 
%correct 
1F 
%correct 
2F 
%correct 
3F 
II-1-M 72 23 90 98 99 100 
       
II-2-M 48 36 69 99 100 98 
       
II-3-M 48 4 98 100 100 100 
       
II-4-M 48 11 91 100 100 100 
       
II-5-M 145 52 74 97 96 99 
       
II-6-M 48 15 89 99 100 100 
       
II-7-M 72 17 89 97 100 100 
       
II-8-M 72 10 95 99 100 100 
Mean 69.13 21 86.88 98.63 99.38 99.63 
       
II-1-D 72 104 90 99 99 99 
       
II-2-D 72 20 85 99 100 100 
       
II-3-D 48 5 99 100 100 99 
       
II-4-D 733 94 96 82 96 100 
       
II-5-D 360 58 93 92 95 100 
       
II-6-D 72 53 93 98 100 100 
       
II-7-D 72 32 81 99 99 100 
       
II-8-D 96 98 35 96 100 100 
Mean 190.63 58 84 95.63 98.63 99.75 
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baseline criteria with an average of 21 errors.  The subjects in the Detailed Instructions 
Group acquired baseline trials in an average of 191 trials making 58 errors.   This 
apparent mean difference was largely due to slow acquisition by just two of the subjects 
(II-4-D & II-5-D) and a one-factor between-subjects ANOVA confirmed that there were 
no significant differences between groups for trials [F (1, 14)=1.99, p>.05] and for 
errors[F (1,14)=6.54,p>.05]. 
The possibility of a typicality effect in acquisition was assessed for baseline errors 
for both groups.  Figure 8 and Table 5 show that both the groups were similar in that the 
most errors were made on trials with zero-feature (trigrams) stimuli.  A two-factor 
within-subjects ANOVA confirmed there was no main effect of Instructions [F 
(1,7)=0.53, p>.05] and no interaction [F (3,21)=0.12, p>.05]; however, there was a 
significant main effect for Features [F (3,21)=11.53, p<.01].   A Tukey’s post hoc test 
found the Zero- Feature condition was significantly different from the One, Two, and 
Three-Feature condition (p>.05). 
Baseline Reaction Times 
As seen in Table 6, most subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group as well as 
most subjects in the Detailed Instructions Group responded slowest on trials with zero-
feature stimuli.  Mean baseline speed scores for sessions 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 9.  
As Figure 9 shows, responding on zero-feature and one-feature stimuli was the slowest 
for both groups.    Speed scores for trials with two and three-feature stimuli were slightly 
higher than the speed scores of zero-feature and one-feature stimuli for both groups.  A 
two-factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed there was no significant difference  
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Figure 8.  Percent correct on baseline errors for each number of features for subjects in 
Experiment 2. 
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Table 6. 
 
Speed scores for baseline trials, equal probe trials and unequal probe trials for subjects in 
Experiment 2. 
 
 Baseline Trials  Equal Probe Trials Unequal Probe Trials 
Subject 0F 1F 2F 3F 1F 2F 3F 4F 1F 2F 3F 4F 
II-1-M .5 .5 .5 0.45 .3 .5 .4 0.4 .4 .38 .38 .48 
             
II-2-M .2 .3 .3 0.27 .2 .2 .2 0.45 .3 .26 .21 .13 
             
II-3-M 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.45 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.37 0.3 0.4 0.45 0.43 
             
II-4-M 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.56 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.56 0.5 0.59 0.5 0.67 
             
II-5-M 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.59 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.53 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.53 
             
II-6-M 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.59 0.5 0.45 0.48 0.59 
             
II-7-M 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.42 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.34 0.4 0.38 0.4 0.42 
             
II-8-M 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.48 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.48 0.4 0.42 0.42 0.34 
Mean 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.47 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.47 0.4 0.42 0.42 0.45 
             
II-1-D 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.77 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.91 0.7 0.77 0.67 0.83 
             
II-2-D 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.63 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.83 0.5 0.56 0.63 0.91 
             
II-3-D 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.45 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.56 0.5 0.48 0.43 0.53 
             
II-4-D 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.59 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.77 0.4 0.56 0.48 0.59 
             
II-5-D 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.67 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.71 0.6 0.56 0.5 0.63 
             
II-6-D .3 .4 .5 0.42 .2 .3 .4 0.53 .4 .43 .43 .53 
             
II-7-D .3 .3 .3 0.37 .2 .3 .3 0.36 .3 .37 .34 .45 
             
II-8-D .4 .4 .3 0.4 .3 .3 .4 0.5 .3 .37 .34 .45 
Mean .5 .5 .6 0.54 .3 .4 .5 0.65 .5 .51 .48 .62 
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Figure 9.  Mean speed scores on baseline trials for each number of features for subjects in 
Experiment 2. 
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between groups [F (1,7)=1.75, p>.05] and no interaction [F (1,7)=1.75, p>.05].  However 
there was a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=5.62, p<.01].  A Tukey’s post hoc test 
found the Zero-Feature condition was significantly different from the  Two and Three-
Feature condition (p>.05). 
Probe Trials 
While performance on unequal-feature, equal-feature, and symmetry probes 
indicated class-consistent matching for many of the subjects, as seen in Figure 10, 
performance on transitivity probes did not indicate the same degree of class-consistent 
matching for subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group and in the Detailed Instructions 
Group.  As shown in Table 7, only subject # II-3-M had a score high enough to suggest 
the formation of equivalence classes.  All other subjects’ scores suggest that equivalence 
classes had not formed. 
Individual speed scores on probe trials, used to assess typicality effects, can be 
seen in Table 6.  Individual speed scores, shown in Table 6, show both groups following 
similar patterns of responding for equal-feature probes. Figure 11 shows subjects’ speed 
scores increasing as the number of features increase on equal-feature probe trials.  The 
Detailed Instructions Group responded slightly faster than the Minimal Instructions 
Group.  However, a two-factor within-subjects ANOVA verified there was no effect of 
Instructions [F (1, 7)=3.47, p>.05].  There was a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=50.88, 
p>.01] suggesting a typicality effect,  and an interaction [F (3,21)=6.37, p>.01].  That is, 
subjects in the Detailed Instructions Group responded faster on trials with four-feature 
stimuli than did subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group. A Tukey’s post hoc test  
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Figure 10. Percent correct on symmetry, transitivity, and novel probe trials for subjects in 
Experiment 2. 
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Table 7. 
Percent correct on probe trials for subjects in Experiment 2. 
Subjects Unequal Equal Symmetry Transitivity 
II-1-M 92 72 100 43 
     
II-2-M 93 94 96 83 
     
II-3-M 94 91 100 98 
     
II-4-M 97 93 100 58 
     
II-5-M 94 92 100 65 
     
II-6-M 95 94 100 85 
     
II-7-M 93 91 98 61 
     
II-8-M 94 95 100 78 
Mean 94 90.25 99.25 71.38 
     
II-1-D 91 90 86 54 
     
II-2-D 90 88 96 54 
     
II-3-D 92 89 100 52 
     
II-4-D 89 86 95 67 
     
II-5-D 88 88 92 67 
     
II-6-D 92 92 92 46 
     
II-7-D 95 94 100 48 
     
II-8-D 92 91 96 58 
Mean 91.13 89.75 94.63 55.75 
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Figure 11.  Mean speed scores on novel probe trials for each number of features for 
subjects in minimal instructions condition (top) and detailed instructions condition 
(bottom) in Experiment 2. 
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found there was a significant difference between all groups (p<.05) on number of 
features.  That is, the Four-Feature condition was significantly different from the Three-
Feature condition which was significantly different from the Two-Feature condition 
which was significantly different from the One-Feature condition. 
Table 6 shows more variation between groups for unequal-feature probes.  Figure 
11 shows slower responding for subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group with a slight 
increase in responding on four-feature trials.  The Detailed Instructions Group shows 
much faster responding on four-feature stimuli than on one, two, and three-feature stimuli 
trials.  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed a main effect of Features [F 
(3,21)=17.65, p>.01], but there was no effect of Instructions [F (1,7)=2.28, p>.05] and no 
interaction [F (3,21)=1.8, p>.05].  A Tukey’s post hoc test found the One, Two, and 
Three-Feature Groups were significantly different from the Four-Feature Group (p>.05). 
Sort and Rating Task 
 As seen in Table 8, most subjects improved significantly in the post-sort task in 
comparison to the pre-sort task.  A strong typicality effect is indicated in mean ratings 
plotted in Figure 12.  Figure 12 shows that subjects’ ratings of the stimuli increased as the 
number of relevant features increased.  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed 
a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=15.23, p<.01].  There was no effect of Instructions [F 
(1,7)=0.9, p>.05] and no interaction [F (3,21)=0.4, p>.05].  A Tukey’s post hoc test found 
the One and Two-Feature conditions were significantly different from the Three and 
Four-Feature conditions (p>.05). 
Discussion 
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Figure 12.  Mean post sort ratings for each number of features for subjects in Experiment 
2. 
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Table 8. 
Sort scores and ratings for subjects in Experiment 2. 
Subject 
Pre-
sort 
Post-
sort 
1-
Feature 
2-
Feature 
3-
Feature 
4-
Feature 
II-1-M 50 100 3 3 6.5 8 
       
II-2-M 59 100 2.6 4.7 6.5 8 
       
II-3-M 38 100 2.8 4 6.5 8 
       
II-4-M 59 100 4 6.3 4.6 4.3 
       
II-5-M 67 80 1.6 5.6 6.6 6 
       
II-6-M 38 100 2.5 5 6.5 8 
       
II-7-M 33 100 4.5 1 5.8 7.3 
       
II-8-M 33 100 4 1 5.5 8 
Mean 47.13 97.5 3.1 3.8 6.06 7.2 
       
II-1-D 38 100 3 3.3 6.7 7.3 
       
II-2-D 61 100 3.3 6.7 5 6.3 
       
II-3-D 38 100 2.9 4.7 6.5 7 
       
II-4-D 38 85 6.3 3 2.7 2.7 
       
II-5-D 38 90 2.8 2.7 7 6.7 
       
II-6-D 38 100 3.3 2.3 6.7 7.3 
       
II-7-D 42 100 2.3 3 7 6.7 
       
II-8-D 38 100 2.8 3.7 6.5 8 
Mean 41.38 96.88 3.3 3.7 6.01 6.5 
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In Experiment 2, trigrams were removed from the sample and node position to see 
if equivalence and typicality would be affected.  There was some evidence of result 
similar to those in the Galizio et al. study and in Experiment 1, such as relatively high 
levels of performance on symmetry, unequal-feature, and equal-feature probes.  
However, it appears that in Experiment 2, a critical feature is missing: the formation of 
equivalence classes.  The subjects in this experiment appear to have formed some kind of 
class as evidenced by improvements in the post-sort task, but without the accurate 
performance on transitivity tests, these classes cannot be considered equivalence classes.   
This finding is puzzling and requires further consideration. 
One possible explanation for these results is that the sample in this experiment 
facilitated identity matching among features.  To review, in the Galizio et al. study and in 
Experiment 1, baseline training always involved matching a trigram to an abstract shape.  
In Experiment 2 the sample was always one of the three prototype abstract shapes.  In 
this experiment on every trial, excluding the trials where the trigrams were comparisons, 
subjects could simply look at the sample, which always contained all four relevant 
features, and pick the comparison that had at least one of the same features.  This may 
explain why subjects rapidly acquired the baselines and did well on symmetry, unequal-
feature, and equal-feature probes, which also permitted identity matching, but failed to 
match in a class-consistent manner when it came to transitivity trials, which included 
only stimuli that shared no common features.  This claim can be supported through 
inspection of Figure 8, which shows that subjects made a large number of errors on 
baseline trials that involved trigrams, but made only a small number of errors on the other 
trial types. 
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For this reason, it seems that the results of Experiment 2 may not be comparable 
to the results found in the Galizio et al. study and Experiment 1.  In addition, it cannot be 
concluded that it was the training structure, per se, that resulted in the failure to form 
equivalence classes but rather, the possibility of feature matching.  These results led to 
Experiment 3, which used the same procedures and training structure, but replaced the 
prototype samples of Experiment 2 with one set of one-feature abstract shapes, to reduce 
identity matching with features.  With the sample containing only one of the relevant 
features, there were far fewer trials where identity matching could occur.  For example, if 
the sample was a one-feature appendage (Stimulus E1 in Figure 1.),  then comparisons 
including the other one-feature stimuli (Stimulus F1, G1, or H1 in Figure 1), the two-
feature stimuli (Stimulus E1 in Figure 1), and the trigrams (Stimulus A1 in Figure 1) 
would not present an opportunity to identity match features.  If the subjects were only 
matching identical features, they would never get enough trials correct within a block to 
move on to probe trials.  Experiment 3 was conducted to address the same questions as 
Experiment 2 with the hope that the results would be clarified by reducing the likelihood 
of identity matching. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Participants 
 There were 16 participants in Experiment 3.  The participants were undergraduate 
students from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington.  Participants received 
credit to fulfill course requirements in psychology classes. 
Procedure 
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All aspects of the procedures were the same as Experiment 2 except that one-
feature stimuli served as the samples for training and novel probe testing.  There were 
four different one-feature training stimuli (see Figure 1).  For this reason, four subjects 
received training in which the samples were one-feature appendage stimuli, four subjects 
received training with one-feature base stimuli, four subjects received training with one-
feature fill stimuli, and four subjects received training with one-feature insert stimuli. 
Results and Discussion 
Acquisition  
Number of trials to criterion for baseline conditional discriminations ranged from 
72 to 821.  Total number of trials and errors during acquisition are shown in Table 9. As 
Table 9 shows, it took subjects in the minimal instruction group an average of 364 trials 
to acquire baselines, making an average of 139 errors.  The subjects in the Detailed 
Instructions Group acquired baseline trials in an average of 323 trials making 113 errors.  
A one- factor between-subjects ANOVA confirmed the absence of significant differences 
either for trials [F (1,14)=0.04, p>.05] or for errors  [F (1,14)=0.38, p>.05].   
Typicality effects were assessed for baseline errors for both groups.  Figure 13 
shows that the instructional groups were similar in that the most errors were made on 
trials with zero and one-feature stimuli.  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed 
there was no main effect of Instructions [F (1,7)=0.71, p>.05] and no interaction [F (4, 
28)=2.09, p>.05].  However, there was a significant typicality effect with a main effect on 
Features [F (3,21)=30.90, p<.01].   A Tukey’s post hoc test found that the Zero-Feature 
and One-Feature Groups were significantly different from the Two-Feature, Three-
Feature, and Four-Feature Groups (p<.05),  which did not differ from one another. 
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Table 9. 
 
Number of trials to meet criterion, total errors, and percent correct on baseline errors by 
number of features for subjects in Experiment 3. 
 
Subject Trials Errors 
%correct 
0F 
%correct 
1F 
%correct 
2F 
%correct 
3F 
%correct 
4F 
III-1-M 264 84 92 82 100 93 98 
        
III-2-M 264 87 88 85 85 98 98 
        
III-3-M 72 23 96 95 98 99 98 
        
III-4-M 821 339 70 72 80 85 90 
        
III-5-M 192 79 80 84 100 98 100 
        
III-6-M 312 178 92 75 100 92 98 
        
III-7-M 432 153 77 79 100 86 99 
        
III-8-M 557 168 92 85 99 90 100 
Mean 364.25 138.88 85.88 82.13 95.25 92.63 97.63 
        
III-1-D 228 186 88 65 87 99 99 
        
III-2-D 456 98 95 82 100 93 100 
        
III-3-D 679 224 56 70 70 99 99 
        
III-4-D 408 157 75 76 99 91 99 
        
III-5-D 192 41 90 89 97 100 100 
        
III-6-D 168 41 83 70 90 95 98 
        
III-7-D 192 77 77 80 85 98 99 
        
III-8-D 264 82 75 76 95 94 99 
Mean 323.38 113.25 79.88 76 90.38 96.13 99.13 
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Figure 13.  Percent correct on baseline errors for each number of features for subjects in 
Experiment 3. 
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Baseline Reaction Times 
 
As seen in Table 10, most subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group as well as 
most subjects in the Detailed Instructions Group responded fastest to trials with four- 
feature stimuli.  Mean baseline speed scores for sessions 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 14.  
As Figure 14 shows, responding became faster as number of features increased.  A two-
factor within-subjects ANOVA confirmed there was no significant difference between  
groups [F (1,7)=1.39, p>.05].   However there was a main effect of Features [F 
(4,28)=13.12, p<.01] demonstrating a typicality effect and an interaction [F (4,28)=5.03, 
p<.01] indicating that with detailed instructions, subjects responded faster on three and 
four-feature trials. A simple main effect of feature number was significant for both 
detailed and minimal instructions group.  A Tukey’s post hoc test found that the Minimal 
Instructions Group and the Detailed Instructions Group were significantly different on 
trials containing three and four-feature stimuli (p<.05). 
Probe Trials 
As shown in Table 11 and Figure 15, subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group 
had high accuracy on symmetry probes.  However, on transitivity and novel probe trials, 
some subjects did not perform as well.  In the Detailed Instructions Group, seven out of 
eight subjects formed equivalence classes.  In contrast, only five out of eight subjects in 
the Minimal Group showed evidence of equivalence.  Subjects # III-4-M and # III-8-M 
performed only slightly better than chance with scores of 46 and 43 on transitivity trials.  
Although, Subject # III-6-M did better than chance with a score of 79 on transitivity 
trials, it does not seem this score is high enough to meet most criteria for the formation of 
equivalence classes.  In addition, half of the subjects (III-4-M, III-5-M, III-6-M, and III- 
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Table 10. 
 
Speed scores for baseline trials and equal and unequal probe trials for subjects in 
Experiment 3. 
 
      Baseline Trials   Equal Probe Trials Unequal Probe Trials 
Subject 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 1F 2F 3F 4F 1F 2F 3F 4F 
III-1-M 0.32 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.32 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.26 0.3 0.32 0.31 0.37 
              
III-2-M 0.42 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.48 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.32 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.32 
              
III-3-M 0.48 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.42 0.37 0.38 
              
III-4-M 0.38 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.71 0.5 0.56 0.67 0.67 
              
III-5-M 0.33 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.48 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.63 0.8 0.59 0.53 0.83 
              
III-6-M 0.33 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.48 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.19 0.4 0.4 
              
III-7-M 0.33 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.48 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.31 0.37 0.63 
              
III-8-M 0.32 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.48 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.28 0.43 0.5 
Mean 0.36 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.47 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.48 0.4 0.37 0.43 0.51 
              
III-1-D 0.38 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.42 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.67 0.3 0.33 0.34 0.5 
              
III-2-D 0.59 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.77 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.77 0.5 0.63 0.63 0.71 
              
III-3-D 0.33 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.56 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.89 0.4 0.5 0.53 0.67 
              
III-4-D 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.67 0.5 0.48 0.83 0.63 
              
III-5-D 0.29 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.38 0.2 0.24 0.27 0.43 
              
III-6-D 0.56 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.77 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.71 0.7 0.63 0.63 0.71 
              
III-7-D 0.42 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.33 0.37 
              
III-8-D 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.59 0.4 0.45 0.43 0.59 
Mean 0.43 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.56 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.63 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.58 
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Figure 14.  Mean speed scores on baseline trials for each number of features for subjects 
in Experiment 3. 
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Table 11. 
 
Percent correct on probe trials for subjects in Experiment 3. 
 
Subject Unequal Equal Symmetry Transitivity 
III-1-M 93 93 100 98 
     
III-2-M 94 94 100 100 
     
III-3-M 90 89 100 97 
     
III-4-M 67 68 82 46 
     
III-5-M 86 88 96 92 
     
III-6-M 84 85 92 79 
     
III-7-M 93 91 98 100 
     
III-8-M 78 75 77 43 
Mean 85.63 85.38 93.13 81.88 
     
III-1-D 84 78 94 71 
     
III-2-D 94 95 100 100 
     
III-3-D 94 94 100 96 
     
III-4-D 95 92 98 98 
     
III-5-D 94 92 100 100 
     
III-6-D 97 97 100 100 
     
III-7-D 93 92 100 100 
     
III-8-D 95 94 98 98 
Mean 93.25 91.75 98.75 95.38 
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Figure 15. Percent correct on symmetry, transitivity, and novel probe trials for subjects in 
Experiment 3. 
 
 71 
8-M) in the Minimal Instructions Group did not show generalization of class-consistent 
features. That is, subjects’ novel probe scores did not reflect the same degree of mastery 
as did scores on symmetry trials.  In the Detailed Instructions Group, all but one subject  
 (III-1-D) showed mastery of unequal-feature and equal-feature probes, suggesting the 
formation of generalized equivalence classes.  
Individual speed scores on probe trials can be seen in Table 10.  Table 10 shows 
both groups following similar patterns of responding for probes where no zero-feature 
probe trials were responded to slower than four-feature trials. Figure 16 shows subjects 
speed scores increasing as the number of features increase, with the Detailed Instructions 
Group responding slightly faster then the Minimal Instructions Group on novel trials.  A 
two-factor within-subjects ANOVA on equal-feature probe latencies verified there was 
no effect of Instructions [F (1, 7)=0.41, p>.05] and no interaction [F (3,21)=2.37, p>.05]. 
There was a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=76.93, p>.01] suggesting a typicality 
effect.    A Tukey’s post hoc test found the One-Feature condition was significantly 
different from the Two-Feature condition, the One-Feature and Two-Feature condition 
were significantly different from the Three-Feature and Four-Feature condition, and the 
Three-Feature condition was significantly different from the Four-Feature condition, 
(p<.05).  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA on unequal-feature probe latencies 
verified there was no effect of Instructions [F (1, 7)=0.50, p>.05] and no interaction [F 
(3,21)=0.30, p>.05]. There was a main effect of Features [F (3,21)=9.19, p>.01] 
suggesting a typicality effect.  A Tukey’s post hoc test found the One-Feature and Two-
Feature condition to be significantly different from the Four-Feature condition, (p<.05). 
Sort and Rating Task 
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Figure 16.  Mean speed scores by feature number on novel probe trials for subjects in the 
minimal instructions condition (top) and the detailed instructions condition (bottom) in 
Experiment 3. 
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As seen in Table 12, most subjects improved significantly on the post-sort task in 
comparison to the pre-sort task. Subjects were mostly random on the pre-sort task, but 
were nearly perfect on the post-sort task.    A strong typicality effect is indicated by mean 
ratings plotted in Figure 17.  Figure 17 shows subjects’ ratings of the stimuli increased as 
the number of relevant features increased.  A two-factor within-subjects ANOVA 
confirmed a main effect on Features [F (3,21)=35.05, p<.01].  There was no effect of 
Instructions [F (1,7)=3.49, p>.05] and no interaction [F (3,21)=0.93, p>.05]   
In the Detailed Instructions Group, seven out of eight subjects showed generalized 
equivalence classes, and typicality effects were found in baseline errors, baseline and 
probe speed scores, as well as post sort ratings.  While some of the subjects in the 
Minimal Instructions Group also showed these effects, it was much less consistent. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This set of experiments was conducted to expand on the findings of the Galizio et 
al. study.  There was interest in the effects of training structure and instructions on the 
subjects’ success in forming equivalence classes and showing typicality effects.  
Experiment 1 used a many-to-one training structure to see what outcomes this opposite 
training would have.  Results from Experiment 1 were that subjects successfully formed 
equivalence classes, but typicality effects were not as strong as in the Galizio et al. study.  
Results from Experiment 1 showed typicality effects in baseline errors and post-sort 
ratings, but unlike the Galizio et al. study, no typicality effects in baseline and probe-trial 
speed scores were obtained.  The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the Galizio et 
al. findings under several new conditions.  First, a new training structure that involved 
removing the trigram from the node and sample position was used.  This training  
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Table 12. 
 
Sort scores and ratings for subjects in Experiment 3. 
 
Subject 
Pre-
sort 
Post-
sort 
1-
Feature 
2-
Feature 
3-
Feature 
4-
Feature 
III-1-M 38 100 2.7 4.3 6.5 8 
       
III-2-M 37 100 2.7 4.3 6.5 8 
       
III-3-M 61 100 2.8 4 6.5 8 
       
III-4-M 38 38 4.8 4 4.2 4 
       
III-5-M 27 100 2.8 4 7.5 6 
       
III-6-M 38 92 2.9 3.3 6.8 7.3 
       
III-7-M 33 100 3.4 2.3 6 8 
       
III-8-M 38 38 5.2 5.3 3.5 2 
Mean 38.75 83.5 3.4 3.9 5.9 6.4 
       
III-1-D 38 59 3.8 5 5.2 5.3 
       
III-2-D 34 100 2.6 4.3 6.5 8 
       
III-3-D 42 96 2.7 4 6.5 8 
       
III-4-D 61 100 2.9 3.3 7 7.3 
       
III-5-D 42 100 2.8 4 8.3 6.7 
       
III-6-D 51 100 2.8 5 6.5 8 
       
III-7-D 38 100 2.5 5 6.5 8 
       
III-8-D 38 100 3 3 6.3 8 
Mean 43 94.38 2.9 4.2 6.6 7.4 
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Figure 17.  Mean post sort ratings for each number of features for subjects in Experiment 
3. 
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structure was a one-to-many training structure, which placed the prototype in the 
sample/node position.  Second, a minimal set of instructions was introduced.  Findings 
from Experiment 2 revealed that subjects failed to form equivalence classes, perhaps due 
to feature identity matching developed during the training. Experiment 3 also used a one- 
to-many training structure, with one-feature abstract shapes as the sample to reduce 
control by identity matching.  Subjects’ performances in the Detailed Instructions Group 
in Experiment 3 closely paralleled Galizio et al.’s findings in several ways.  Most 
subjects formed generalized equivalence classes, and showed typicality effects in 
baseline errors and latencies, probe latencies, and post-sort ratings.  The success of these 
subjects confirmed that the trigram does not have to be the sample or the node in order 
for family resemblance classes to form and typicality effects to occur. Yet, it seems that 
the instructions may have influenced the subjects’ performances.  Unlike results obtained 
from subjects in the Detailed Instructions Group, results from subjects in the Minimal 
Instructions Group were not comparable to the Galizio et al. study in terms of the 
formation of equivalence classes.  
As discussed earlier, the interpretation of the Experiment 2 results is somewhat 
problematic.  It seems that Experiment 2 did not serve the purpose it was intended to and 
the questions that were proposed were not answered in a meaningful way.  Due to the 
nature of the training structure, subjects seemed to have learned the baselines by simple 
identity matching of features.  To review, subjects were given the prototype as the sample 
and were required to match it to the other abstract shapes and trigrams.  On a large 
majority of trials (21/24), subjects could simply choose the comparison that had a feature 
that matched one or more of the sample’s features.   Their scores reflected mastery of the 
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conditional discriminations and subjects were moved on to probe trials.  Subjects could 
continue to use this strategy of feature matching on symmetry, unequal-feature, and 
equal-feature probe trials, and show high performance levels.  However, when subjects 
were given transitivity trials, this approach was no longer possible. Common features 
between sample and class-consistent comparisons were absent on transitivity trials, 
making it impossible on most trials to feature match.  That subjects performed at very 
low levels on these trials made it clear that, in fact, these subjects had not formed 
equivalence classes.   
Unlike Experiment 2, subjects in Experiment 1 and in the Detailed Instructions 
Group in Experiment 3 did form equivalence classes.  Subjects in Experiment 1 were 
trained with a many-to-one structure in which the comparison, the trigram, was also the 
node.  Subjects in Experiment 3 were trained with a one-to-many structure in which the 
one-feature stimuli served as the sample and the node.  Subjects in both experiments 
showed evidence of generalized stimulus equivalence.  The formation of equivalence 
classes in both experiments shows that several different training structures can be 
successful in training generalized equivalence. However, it seems that typicality effects, 
especially those assessed through latencies may depend on certain training structures.  
Additionally, instructions did produce differences among groups in forming equivalence 
classes with subjects in the Detailed Instructions Group forming equivalence at a much 
higher rate than the subjects in the Minimal Instructions Group. 
As mentioned before, a surprising difference was found with regards to 
instructions in Experiment 3.  With the exception of subject # III-1-D, the subjects in the 
Detailed Instructions Group performed at a much higher level on unequal-feature, equal-
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feature, and transitivity trials.  The performances by the subjects in the Detailed 
Instructions Group suggest that these subjects had formed generalized equivalence 
classes.  Not only were subjects accurate on transitivity trials, but when subjects were 
presented with novel probe trials, they were successful in abstracting the relevant features 
and matching accordingly.  Yet, only four of the eight subjects in the Minimal 
Instructions Group showed evidence of these generalized equivalence classes. Perhaps 
subjects that were given the detailed instructions were more likely to form classes 
because the instructions explicitly stated that the “objects go together.”  It is possible that 
the generalized equivalence classes would have slowly emerged in subjects in the 
Minimal Instructions Group if more time was available.  Their scores show that they 
were performing well above chance, so it could be that they were not incapable of 
learning generalized equivalence classes, however, they were slower to learn due to the 
instructions. 
Additionally, these experiments speak to the question of the role of the trigram in 
the training structure.  Although the trigrams were involved in the training structure of 
Experiment 3, they served neither as samples nor as nodal stimuli.  Despite this, subjects 
were still able to form generalized stimulus equivalence classes, at least if they received 
detailed instructions.  The issue of naming in the formation of stimulus equivalence 
classes can also be addressed by the success of Experiment 3.  While naming cannot be 
ruled out as a possibility, it would seem that with this structure, naming would be much 
less likely.  The trigram, which can be seen as a name for the class, was presented much 
less frequently.  Furthermore, the trigram was not the nodal stimulus for the classes.  It 
would seem, from the results of this training structure, that naming was not necessary for 
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subjects to form generalized stimulus equivalence classes as Lowe and Beasty (1987) 
suggest. On the other hand, the fact that instructions appeared to modulate this effect 
indicates that verbal factors may indeed play a role.  
Future studies can further address this question.  The success of subjects in this 
study suggests that subjects might also be able to form generalized stimulus equivalence 
classes with a training structure that eliminates the trigram.   Future experiments could 
use the same general procedure and same training structure as Experiments 1 and 3 with 
one exception.  In these experiments, the trigram could be completely taken out of the 
training structure by replacing it with an abstract shape.  Using an abstract shape instead 
of a trigram would not provide subjects with a stimulus that could be used to name the 
class.  Subjects could still come up with a name for the classes, but this training structure 
would not facilitate naming.  If subjects could form generalized stimulus equivalence 
classes with this structure, it would provide further evidence that naming may not be 
necessary for generalized stimulus equivalence classes to form.   
Just as the similarities of Experiments 1 and 3 provide us with a better 
understanding of the conditions necessary to form equivalence classes, the differences of 
these two experiments also further understanding.  One difference involves acquisition of 
baselines.  Subjects in Experiment 1 took much longer to learn baselines than subjects in 
Experiment 3.  Subjects in Experiment 1 acquired baselines in an average of 520 trials 
making an average of 233 errors.  Subjects in Experiment 3 acquired baseline in less 
time, an average of 343 trials, and made fewer errors, on average 126.  These results 
support earlier findings (Saunders, Drake, and Spradlin, 1999; Fields, Hobbie-Reeve, 
Adams, and Reeve, 1999; and Spradlin and Saunders, 1986) that suggest subjects trained 
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with the one-to-many training structure require more trials than subjects trained with 
many-to-one training structure.  
In addition, previous studies (Saunders, Drake, and Spradlin, 1999; Fields, 
Hobbie-Reeve, Adams, and Reeve, 1999; and Spradlin and Saunders, 1986) have found 
that subjects trained with a one-to-many training structure do not perform as well as 
subjects trained with many-to-one training structure on equivalence probes.  The current 
study found this  to be true.  All subjects that were trained with many-to-one structure 
showed equivalence, while only 11 out of 16 subjects trained with one-to-many training 
structure showed equivalence.  However, as mentioned earlier, this difference could be 
due to the different instructions that were used. In Experiment 1, which only used the 
detailed instructions, all of the subjects formed equivalence classes.   Likewise, in 
Experiment 3,  many of the subjects (seven out of eight) in the Detailed Instructions 
Group formed equivalence classes, but only four out of eight subjects in the Minimal 
Instructions Group formed equivalence classes. 
Another important difference between Experiments 1 and 3 involved typicality 
effects.  Like Galizio et al., Experiment 3 found typicality effects in baseline errors, 
baseline and probe response speeds, and post-sort ratings.  In contrast, subjects in 
Experiment 1 showed typicality effects in baseline errors and post-sort ratings, but not on 
either of the response speed measures.  It is possible that the training structure influenced 
this difference.  Another possibility is that the structure of the probes had an influence on 
latencies.   
Experiment 3, which used a one-to-many training structure in baselines, also used 
this structure in probe trials.  This structure requires simultaneous discriminations 
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between the abstract stimuli.  As described earlier, the abstract stimuli were very 
complex, making discriminations difficult and time consuming.  That is, three of the 
abstract stimuli appeared as comparisons, which required subjects to discriminate 
between them and ultimately compare them to the sample.  In Experiment 1, the trigrams 
served as comparisons, making it much less complicated for subjects to discriminate the 
comparison stimuli.  It seems likely that discriminating between three relatively simple 
trigrams would take less time than discriminating between three complex abstract shapes.  
The complexity of the abstract stimuli as comparisons may have required several seconds 
to compare to each other as well as the sample to determine which comparison was the 
correct answer.  It could be that the nature of the comparison display that affected 
latencies.  Typicality effects, as shown in latencies, could have been masked due a ceiling 
effect: the very rapid response times in the many-to-one structure of Experiment 1.  To 
check this prediction, future studies that maintained this structure for baseline trials, but 
changed to a one-to-many training for probe trials could be conducted.  If this prediction 
is correct, results would show a lack of typicality in baseline trials, but typicality could be 
seen in probe-trial latencies. 
To summarize, the similarities of the Galizio et al. study and Experiments 1 and 3 
suggest that different structures, one-to-many with the trigram as the sample, many-to-
one with the trigram as the comparison, and one-to-many with a one-feature shape as the 
sample, can be used to train generalized stimulus equivalence classes.  The results show 
that subjects in Experiment 3, where the trigram was not the sample or the node, 
performed just as well as subjects in Experiment 1, where the trigram was the node.  This 
suggests that neither the trigram nor a particular training structure is an essential part of 
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forming generalized stimulus equivalence classes.  Furthermore, this finding speaks to 
the argument that naming may not be necessary to form equivalence classes. 
Despite the differences across experiments, it appears that different training 
structures can be used to train generalized stimulus equivalence classes and produce 
typicality effects.  The effects observed in the Galizio et al. study are not limited to one 
particular training structure. Furthermore, this evidence of generalization would suggest 
that family-resemblance classes derived from contingencies are a good model for natural 
language categories.  These experiments indicate that several different training structures 
can be used to form language-like equivalence classes with typicality effects.  
 
 
 
